Increasing block tariffs seek a cross-subsidy mechanism between the water network users, based on the common assumption of a low water price elasticity. In Manaus, the capital city of the Brazilian state of Amazonas, where most of the 1.6 million dwellers are supplied through a municipal water network, a substantial consumption drop followed the tariff increase of 2004. This drop questions the cross-subsidy capacity of the current structure. We see this 31.51% tariff increase as a natural experiment applied to the whole network user population of Manaus, and this allows us to measure the impact on monthly consumption of metered households, using month-on-month differences between years 2003 and 2004.
Introduction: access to water and tariff structure issues
Non-linear tariffs for water supply services are widespread, especially increasing block tariffs, the main objectives of which are to favour resource conservation (by charging more for higher consumption), and to introduce cross subsidies from high to low water consumers (by creating an initial consumption block that is heavily subsidised). Assessing the impact of price variations on demand for water within such tariff frameworks is complex, given the endogeneity of consumer price. Much research on price elasticity estimation has thus been biased, as underlined in the review of the literature on residential water demand in Section 3 below (in particular, see Blundell & Nauges (2002) ; Arbués et al. (2003) ; Dalhuisen et al. (2003) ; Olmstead et al. (2007) ). Setting water tariffs remains a controversial issue due to the multiple and often conflicting objectives concerned. For public authorities, in charge of providing their population with access to water, affordability and equity objectives remain the prime concerns; however, these are increasingly accompanied by a drive for economic efficiency due to resource scarcity (whether for environmental reasons, or competition in uses between agricultural and domestic needs) and, more recently, the objective of cost recovery within the framework of water sector reforms. Hence, the following points of concern are important when setting water tariffs:
. the impact of access to water on health and development, in both urban 1 and rural 2 areas, makes water a special good to which access must be ensured regardless of the population's living standards. In many developing countries, this affordability target has led to the introduction of a highly subsidised or even free first consumption block (in South Africa and Belgian Flanders), or of social tariffs targeting specific consumer categories (as in Santiago, Chile); . equity, in its true sense, means that similar consumers receive similar treatment and that those who place an additional load on the system should be charged more. In practice its meaning is often extended to cover equitable pricing that accounts for the living standard of consumers and is thus in line with affordability and fairness targets; . economic efficiency requires a tariff structure that sends the correct signal to consumers (but also to suppliers) indicating financial as well as environmental costs of water use, so as to maximise the aggregated benefits for a given cost of supply; . finally, for the water operator, whether public or private, cost recovery is necessary to ensure financial independence, both for investments for network maintenance and for its expansion 3 .
Over and above the conflicting aspects of these objectives, there is little consensus on the effectiveness of water tariff settings towards these objectives. Massarutto (2006) argues that different concepts in efficiency lead to different optimal price structures (for example, Marginal Cost Pricing allocates water to the most beneficial uses while Full Cost Recovery (FCR) does not; however, Marginal Cost Pricing does not avoid over investment in facilities, while FCR does).
Fixed charge tariffs are still used in industrialised countries where water resources are abundant (i.e. where marginal costs are low or slightly related to quantity produced, as in Canada, Norway, United Kingdom) but also in developing countries, given meter installation and reading costs. There is, therefore, no incentive to limit consumption and favour resource conservation (in the case of low Marginal Cost and low price elasticities, the benefit of quantity pricing would be limited). Social concerns might be dealt with in allocating a fixed consumption level based on the type of dwelling and to differentiate between households by income level. However, in the event of a tariff increase, households have no opportunity to alter their consumption in order to reduce their bill.
Volumetric tariffs based on actual consumption may be uniform, as in Australia, Europe and part of the United States. They usually indicate the short-run marginal cost of using water. Volumetric pricing with decreasing marginal costs might be at odds with cost recovery objectives. Two-part tariffs, widely promoted by the World Bank, aim at achieving economic efficiency (the proportional part being adjusted to marginal cost) while recovering costs (the fixed part usually corresponding to the fixed costs of production and administration). In the context of water scarcity, the fixed part might become negative (a rebate) to maintain a strong signal by means of the proportional part (a scarcity rent might be added to the Short-Run Marginal Cost) without generating excess revenue. 1 Galiani et al. (2005) have shown that the expansion of water supply networks in Argentinian municipalities between 1990 and 1999 reduced infant mortality. 2 Jalan & Ravallion (2003) have shown a reduction in morbidity (in terms of both incidence and severity of diarrhoea cases) as a result of provision of water supply in rural India. 3 Water sector reforms, under impetus from the World Bank, have brought this objective to the top of the agenda to improve existing supply systems and expand water coverage. It also stands as a key principle of the Water Framework Directive adopted in 2000 by the European Union.
Subsidies targeting categories of low-income consumers can be introduced in parallel. They have the advantage of transparency compared to volume-based subsidies, but lead to substantial exclusions, whatever type of targeting mechanisms are in place.
Increasing blocks tariffs (IBT) are widespread in developing countries, as well as in Japan, Spain and in numerous utilities of the United States. Depending on the context, they have been introduced to achieve three objectives: (1) affordability and fairness, with a highly subsidised first block (known as the subsistence block or lifeline rate); (2) resource conservation (high consumption is charged at a higher rate), and (3) economic efficiency, when the upper block corresponds to the short-run marginal cost of using water. The first objective remains rather controversial, given that all users have access to the subsidised block and large families or households sharing connections are disadvantaged, as their consumption reaches higher blocks than that of others. Moreover, these tariffs are often inappropriately designed, with the first block extending well beyond subsistence level, meaning that few consumers are covered by a tariff that reflects marginal cost. As such, they are subject to much criticism (Boland & Whittington, 2000) , but it remains politically difficult to raise questions about such tariff structures which are seen as favouring the poorest. In Jakarta (Indonesia), under pressure from municipal authorities, the so-called social tariffs were exempt from tariff increases 4 , generating a perverse effect in that they strongly dissuaded the water operator from providing service to poor households whose consumption was highly subsidised. The actual regressivity of such structures is, however, largely due to the exclusion of the poorest from supply networks, and therefore their exclusion from consumption subsidies. When water service coverage is high enough, limiting the size of the first block can improve the progressiveness of such a tariff, as long as consumption levels rise with living standard (Komives et al., 2006) .
Water supply in Manaus
Manaus, the capital of the Amazonas state of Brazil, is characterised by a high population growth since 1970, when a free-trade zone was created, as well as a continuous geographical expansion of the city with the appearance of new neighbourhoods, known as invasions. These new neighbourhoods have been progressively integrated into the city by providing urban infrastructure such as roads, electricity and water. In October 2004, the city's population reached 1.6 million, 31% of whom were living below the national poverty line 5 . Income inequalities are very high in the city, as they are throughout Brazil 6 . High-income households are concentrated in the historic central parts and in a western residential area. The poorer households have settled either in the peripheral neighbourhoods (sometimes as a result of specific municipal programmes) or in illegal settlements along the water courses, the Igarapés, that run through Manaus (Figure 1 ).
Since 2000, water and sanitation services have been managed by Aguas do Amazonas, a private operator 7 . Water coverage of the population (80% at the end of 2004, a low level for a Brazilian municipality) was expected to become universal in 2006 based on the initial contract (with a minimum of 95% of the population) 8 thus accompanying the city's geographical expansion. The poorest neighbourhoods remain severely under-equipped and the level of poverty reaches 45% among unconnected households; these households mainly live (but not exclusively) in unsupplied neighbourhoods and get their water from wells, public standpipes or from illegal networks. However, 20% of unconnected households belong to the wealthiest quintiles, such as villas owners in the peripheral areas or housing condominiums, equipped with their own wells or boreholes (Figure 2) .
The sanitation network remains severely limited and covers only 7% of households, mainly in the historical centre. Uncollected effluents are treated by individual systems (septic tanks) for well-off households, or discharged directly into Igarapés, via the storm water drainage system, without any form of treatment.
Water tariffs
The tariff applying in Manaus is a specific tariff per customer category (residential, commercial and industrial, or public) and increases per consumption block, similar to tariff structures current elsewhere in Brazil. For residential users, there are six consumption blocks, with a minimum bill corresponding to 10 m 3 /month (Figure 3 ). 7 In June 2000, Aguas do Amazonas, a subsidiary of Suez Environnement, signed a 30-year concession contract for water and sanitation services with the Manaus municipal authorities. In 2006, the ownership of the company was transferred to the Brazilian group, Solvi. 8 The network should cover 95% of the population, although households should be able to maintain their alternative supply source (wells in particular). Network availability is taken into account rather than effective coverage of households.
The principle of cross-subsidy, inherent to this type of tariff structure (from industry towards households as well as from high consumers towards low consumers) is weakly implemented: 92% of the water charged is consumed by households, of which 83% consume in the first two tariff blocks. The second tariff block is calculated to be close to average price, whereas the first block represents about half of this. Yearly re-evaluations of tariffs to account for inflation (around 10% The average water price for households therefore depends on their monthly consumption, with a fixed minimum of 10 m 3 /month. For households not equipped with meters (i.e. about half of Manaus' residential users) a fixed level of consumption is set on the basis of the number of water outlets in the dwelling. The minimum consumption is fixed at 12 m 3 /month. At first view, several criticisms can be levelled at this tariff structure. The impossibility of providing the cross-subsidies expected from this structure, owing to the absence of high consumers within the supply network (industries, as well as high residential consumers, have their own water resources) leads the operator to increase tariffs in a uniform manner, regularly. In addition to the burden imposed on all users, these tariff increases have the perverse effect of keeping high consumers out of the network without ad hoc regulation on the underground resource use. The tariff blocks do not appear to be well designed here, with a first block too wide to correspond to subsistence consumption (10 m 3 /month is equivalent to 82 litres per person per day for a family of four). This block is heavily subsidised and benefits the entire population, as the median effective consumption of metered households (11.6 m 3 /month in 2003) is not far from the first threshold. Furthermore, the existence of a minimum billing rate of 10 m 3 /month applying to the entire first block is heavily penalising to small consumers (mainly poor and small size households 9 ), whose actual consumption stands below that level (supply characteristics per quintile are given in the Appendix, in Table 10 , available online at http://www. iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf). In parallel with this increasing block structure, 40% of network users are billed at a fixed rate. Here again, the billing threshold of 12 m 3 /month is high for a small sized household. Even though fixed bills, which therefore ensure regular and predictable amounts, protect vulnerable households from excessive bills (especially in the case of leaks), these households do not have the opportunity to adjust their bill via their consumption in case of a substantial increase in tariff.
3. Impact evaluation of a water tariff increase 3.1. Review of the literature on residential water demand Most of the literature on residential demand for water services focuses on estimation of the price elasticity of the demand for water. Tariff issues relating to conditions of access, equity or the well-being of users are rarely addressed in this literature, mainly developed from empirical data in industrialised countries, where the issue of price as a policy instrument for water resource management remains predominant. The meta-analyses by Espey et al. (1997) , then Dalhuisen et al. (2003) , on the numerous empirical studies made since the 1960s, conclude that water demand has low price elasticity (respectively 2 0.51 and 2 0.41 on average) but that the estimated value depends very much on the choice of price variable, data type and model specification. Dalhuisen et al. (2003) , in particular, show that studies based on increasing block tariffs lead to higher price elasticity estimates 10 , as do works using sophisticated price variables (difference or price perception variable) and those using the Hewitt & Hanemann (1995) discrete -continuous choice model based on labour supply works (price elasticities reach 2 1.6 in this case). However, the non-linear nature of most water tariff structures raises issues of identification and econometric specification, making comparisons of approaches that account unequally for these questions somewhat irrelevant, and for which the results may be biased 11 . Billings (1982) shows that accounting for endogeneity increased its Marginal Price elasticity estimates from 2 0.267 to 2 0.561.
The choice of the price variable (the marginal price or average price paid by the household) is not the subject of a full consensus among authors. Nordin (1976) , after works undertaken on electricity demand, modified the price specification by including (in addition to the marginal price) a so-called difference variable (corresponding to the difference between the bill actually paid by the user and what the bill would have been if the marginal price was applied to all of the consumption) so as to introduce an income effect generated by the block tariff structure. This specification was subsequently used by most authors, after an application to the IBTs by Billings & Agthe (1980) . It implies, however, that the user has a refined understanding of the tariff structure, and this question led Shin (1985) to introduce a new price perception parameter. It will depend on the size of the blocks, the existence and amplitude of a fixed part. The transparency of the tariff and the advantage for the user of knowing it in detail, according to its water expenditure ratio, might also count 12 . Most of the analyses have been performed using aggregated municipal data, while Schefter & David (1985) showed that averages for price variables (marginal price or difference variable) must then be weighted by user distributions in each consumption category, information that is missing in a number of studies using aggregated data.
Finally, in such non-linear structures, as the price depends on consumption (both marginal and average prices), estimates obtained by ordinary least squares techniques are biased and inconsistent, and two-stage models (McFadden et al., 1977) or instrumental variables (Billings, 1982; Nieswiadomy & Molina, 1989) lead to better estimates once the endogeneity issue has been addressed. A bias persists because of discontinuities in the tariff structure. For this reason, Hewitt & Hanemann (1995) and Blundell & Nauges (2002) have used maximum likelihood (ML) methods based on discrete choice modelling applied to the analysis of labour supply, where the budget constraint is piece-wise linear. 10 However, Olmstead et al. (2007) explain that observed difference of elasticities may be due to endogenous price structure. Their survey, based on 16 US public utilities, can not definitively rule out the heterogeneity of the utilities in order to identify a behavioural response to price structure. 11 The implications of the choice of variables, of types of data used and specification of models, as well as the main related econometric problems, are detailed in the state-of-the-art review by Arbuès et al. (2003) . 12 The tests carried out by Nieswiadomy & Molina (1991) on water demand with increasing and decreasing block tariffs are not really conclusive given the variance of the price perception parameter.
This modelling provides a correct approach to consumer behaviour and the price elasticities estimated in these latter studies by ML are significantly higher than those estimated with least squares regression or in two-stage models. However, Blundell & Nauges (2002) , after testing, rejected the assumption of normality of error terms required by the ML method, thus invalidating the results obtained. They propose an alternative non-parametric method of choice modelling (series) and estimate lower average price elasticity (2 0.36 instead of 2 0.68 by ML). They also show an inverse gradation of elasticity with income level (price elasticity is lower for well-off households than for poor households which are more sensitive to price 13 ). The main implications of non-linear tariffs for the demand function, and for econometric specifications, are developed below.
3.1.1. Implications of non-linear tariffs on the demand function. Non-linear tariffs raise issues of specification of the demand function similar to those encountered in the literature on labour supply, when incomes are taxed progressively with threshold (see Burtless & Hausman, 1978; Moffitt, 1986) .
In the simplified context of an increasing tariff with two blocks with prices p 1 and p 2 (l 1 is the limit of block 1), where q is the water consumption and z the consumption of a composite good bringing together the other goods with unit cost normalised to 1, the budget constraint of a household that maximises a strictly concave utility function is written as:
and might be written as:
The term I þ ( p 1 2 p 2 )·l 1 is the virtual income whereas D ¼ ( p 2 2 p 1 )·l 1 is called the difference variable. This quantity corresponds to the difference between what the bill would be if all consumption was charged at marginal rate and the actual bill. It is positive and can be interpreted as an implicit subsidy in the context of increasing tariffs. These variables (virtual income or difference variable) were introduced after the works on electricity demand by Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976) to account for transfers implied by block rates.
The budget constraint is then piece-wise linear, i.e. the constraint consists of a number of segments joined together at kink points (see Figure 5 ).
3.1.2. Implications of non-linear tariffs on econometric specification of the model and approaches for parameters estimation. The main problems in specifying a water demand model are the co-determination of price and consumption (simultaneity) as well as the existence of possible discontinuities and jumps in demand at the limits of the blocks. The estimation techniques used to overcome simultaneity of consumption and marginal price and difference are mainly instrumental variables (Billings (1982) linearizes the marginal prices and difference variables using the tariff structures applied) and two-stage least squares (McFadden et al. (1977) uses the average price estimated from predicted consumption with the amount billed). These two methods, although they address the problem of endogeneity of the consumer price variable, imply linearisation of the tariff structure. By way of simplification, the estimated functions are usually linear functions or, more often, log-linear, implicitly assuming that price elasticity remains constant with price 14 . These functions imply direct modelling of consumption without, however, modelling the choice of block. Accounting for discontinuities requires modelling of demand conditionally to the choice of consumption block.
In a two-block setting, where p 1 and p 2 are the prices and y 1 and y 2 are the virtual incomes in blocks 1 and 2, and where the budget constraint is convex, the conditional demand is:
and the unconditional demand, corresponding to the combination of the discrete choice (choice of consumption block) and continuous choices, is therefore: The corresponding stochastic model brings in two types of errors, after the work of Burtless & Hausman (1978) and Moffitt (1986) :
where 1 corresponds to the heterogeneity in household preferences, which escape analysis (unobservables, specification errors, etc.), and h corresponds to an optimisation error by households (due to the difference between desired and actual consumption).
The likelihood for one observation can be estimated assuming the normality and homoskedasticity of error terms. The results of estimation are, however, sensitive to these hypotheses and non-parametric methods make it possible to overcome this (see Blundell & Nauges, 2002) .
Impact evaluation in a natural experiment context
Natural experiment methods, often known as Difference in Difference methods, have been developed to measure the impact of a shock or a policy, generally covered by the term treatment, using data from before and after the treatment studied. The central issue for such approach is the absence of a counterfactual scenario (i.e. the situation of individuals or households without the treatment).
The impact measured is the average treatment effect on the individuals or households treated (average treatment effect on the treated):
, the parameter of interest for the individuals or households, is observable.
, the parameter of interest for these same individuals or households in the absence of treatment (counterfactual) is approached by E(Y 0 /X, D ¼ 0), observable for individuals or households not affected by the treatment.
3.2.1. Simple difference estimator. The simple difference (or before/after) estimator uses the outcome variables measured before treatment to approximate the counterfactual situation.
For treatment implemented on date k(t . k . t 0 ), Y 0,t 0 is the outcome variable before treatment and for each individual or household
is the selection bias. If the average can be considered to be zero, then ð Y 1;t 2 Y 0;t 0 =D ¼ 1Þ is the effect due to treatment for the treated individuals or households (average measured after and before treatment).
3.2.2. Difference in difference estimator. For the Difference in Difference (DD) estimator, if the average selection bias cannot be assumed to be zero (the outcome variable cannot be considered as identical in the absence of treatment) a control group must be identified that is not affected by the treatment (or not treated) and a Difference in Difference method applied, assuming that the effects over time are common to both groups. This rules out the effects of unobservables for households as well as macro effects affecting all households. The choice of a control group in line with this assumption, crucial for the evaluation, is the main difficulty in applying this method (Heckman et al., 1999) . The implicit assumption is that in the absence of a programme, the outcome variable is the same in the treated group as in the untreated group, i.e.
is an estimator of the effects of the treatment on the treated E(Y 1,t 2 Y 0,t /D ¼ 1)
The effect can be considered as homogeneous within the treated households (simple case). For treatment at date k:
where a measures the homogeneous effect of treatment for the treated group (for whom d i , the binary variable for participation in treatment, is equal to 1), Y is the explained variable, X is all of the exogenous variables, and U i,t is the error term of mean zero, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with X. It is also possible to consider that the effect is not homogeneous for all individuals:
where E(1 i jd i ¼ 1) is the mean deviation of the impact among treated individuals.
The average effect a cannot be identified if the fact of belonging to the treated group is not independent of household characteristics as E(1 i jd i ¼ 1) is not necessarily zero. Only the effect of treatment on the treated a T ¼ a þ Eð1 i jd i ¼ 1Þ can then be identified without further assumptions (Blundell & Costa Dias, 2000) .
A tariff increase or an income tax rise (see Piketty, 1999) can be considered as an exogenous shock and analysed using a Difference in Difference approach. This can be done by before/after estimation, assuming constant consumption in the absence of the tariff increase (controlling for observable effects determining the consumption level) or by a Difference in Difference method with identification of a consumer group not affected by the increase (Bertrand et al. (2003) underline that the serial correlation issue must be taken into account).
Impact of the 2004 water price increase in Manaus
For the [2003] [2004] period, a drop in monthly water consumption of about 4.5% was observed for metered households. This is the result of several factors which need to be distinguished: there was an extension of the network to low-income neighbourhoods with lower water consumption levels; introduction of metering programmes (replacing fixed consumption billing); and an actual drop in water consumption under the impact of the tariff increase. In parallel with the consumption drop, bill recovery dropped over the period and the number of disconnections increased significantly. To measure the specific impact of the tariff increase, an analysis was carried out on all connected households in Manaus, based on monthly consumption data, status of connections and delays in bill payment between January 2003 and December 2004.
Dataset description
The initial Aguas do Amazonas residential customer database (Table 1) 16 . The dataset was restricted to two main types of connections: water, or water and sanitation, and for which the water connection was active at least once over the 24 month period (6.9% of connections in the database remained inactive during the study period; they were not retained in the dataset). Data were monitored monthly in terms of connection status (active or not); type of connection (meter or fixed bill, and water only, or water and sanitation (sanitation giving rise to billing for an additional amount equal to 80% of the price of water); whether or not the connection was shared by several households (each household then being billed individually); and monthly consumption (whether metered or allocated for households without meters). The measured consumption was divided by the number of households sharing the connections, so as to be expressed as monthly consumption per household. Aberrant values for measured consumption (resulting from meters) were replaced by the consumption actually billed when this was above the billing threshold. As the price of water depends on the consumption block, a reference category variable was created to break down the households by level of consumption: this corresponds, for each household, to the average consumption category in 2003. Payment recovery within 10 days, available as an amount paid, was converted into a binary variable corresponding to payment or default within 10 days after invoice.
4.1.1. Cases of zero consumption. Cases of zero consumption represent a significant proportion of the consumption recorded for metered connections considered to be active. They are billed at the minimum threshold of 10 m 3 but can cover a variety of situations: empty dwellings (of the 4231 connections with consumption always at zero over the period, 53% of them nevertheless pay their bills on time); meter reading errors (these are corrected by readers the following month); or by-passing of meters concealing actual but un-measurable consumption. Several types of processing were applied to eliminate the noise that data from these connections could generate 17 . Monthly average rainfall and temperature data complete the analysis, given the seasonal nature of consumption. Although annual temperature and rainfall were similar 
Main variations during study period (January 2003 to December 2004).
Expansion of the water supply network compensated the urban population growth, estimated at 3.2%/year, the number of active connections having increased by 7.9% in 2 years. This increase is partially explained by actual new connections (18,029-84% of which were equipped with meters) but also by activation of existing connections (9,320 in all). 80% of the new connections were made in low-income neighbourhoods which are also the majority of new neighbourhoods. In parallel with the supply network extension, some connections became permanently inactive 18 between January 2003 and October 2004 (7459, of which 64% were unmetered connections). The proportion of meters increased as a result of the new connections, most of which are metered (whereas most disconnections were of unmetered connections), 17 Cases of zero consumption preceding initial non-zero consumption were eliminated (these generally corresponded to new connections not yet in use). Connections for which consumption becomes zero were identified as such and the corresponding consumption eliminated as they may be connections that have become inactive or that have been by-passed. Occasional zero consumptions were smoothed by taking the average with the following month. 18 In this context, permanently inactive means inactive for at least three consecutive months. Connections inactive for only the last two months were not taken into account, as this may have been a temporary condition. but also as a result of metering programmes on existing connections. The proportion went from 52.2% of connections active in January 2003, to 63.1% in December 2004. The level of connections to the sanitation system went from 9.4% to 10.7% of active residential connections (see Figure 7) .
Descriptive analysis of consumption variations.
In order to analyse variations in consumption, apart from changes in the sample structure, descriptive analysis was performed on a cylindered sample: this was restricted to households equipped with a meter maintaining an active connection throughout the study period, i.e. 97,533 connections (74% of all metered connections active in December 2004).
The graphs of monthly consumption figures over time, grouped by residence area, show two main trends (see Figure 8) :
. there is a positive correlation between income level, proxied here by residence area 19 , and water consumption level. This income-level indicator is nevertheless flawed as it represents the income level per neighbourhood, whereas the consumption is restricted to connected and metered households. In the case of Area 1 (where the consumption level is the lowest, i.e. 13.4 m 3 /month in 2003 and 12.9 m 3 /month in 2004), the water coverage is low (38% in 2000) and only 30% of connected households have meters. Unconnected households in these neighbourhoods have few private boreholes and are mainly dependent on the municipal standpipes or illicit networks. It is therefore very likely that the water consumption recorded for Area 1 corresponds to consumption by the better-off households only, and these are not necessarily poorer, on average, than those of Area 2 where the majority of households are connected and metered. Conversely, the missing households in Area 4 (the area with the highest consumption level, i.e. 19. /month minimum consumption threshold 20 (and therefore able to adjust their bill depending on the price), the drop in consumption from January 2004 appears clearly, and for each residence area (see Figure 9 ).
Beyond the billing threshold, the reduction in water consumption by metered households is, on average, 2 10% between the two years. The greatest drop is observed in the neighbourhoods with monthly income below 1,000 Réais 21 (2 11% on average, see Table 2 ). However, two non-independent effects may have an impact: income effect and initial consumption level effect. Breaking down the data into consumption block enables these two effects to be isolated, at least partially (see Figure 10) . Table 2 ). These variations are to be compared with those of households in Block 1 22 , i.e. those consuming below the 10 m 3 /month billing threshold, for which average consumption rose by 9% over the same period, though their actual billed consumption remained the same. (See Table 2 ). 4.1.4. Comparison of consumption variation between groups consuming above and below the threshold. As users consuming below the billing threshold cannot adjust their bills by modifying their consumption, they could serve as a control group, on the assumption that any price increases do not affect their consumption, and that the consumption trend in the absence of increase (i.e. the counterfactual situation in relation to households billed for consumption) is the trend actually observed for this group. This natural trend, in the absence of price rise, seems to be towards a gradual increase in consumption (þ9% observed). Detailed graphic analysis of metered household consumption shows opposing trends on either side of the billing threshold without, however, correcting for variations arising in the period (see Figure 11) . 20 Households consuming above the billing threshold represent 63% of all previous connections (and only 60% of metered connections living in Areas 1 and 2, the others consuming below the minimum billing threshold). 21 Réais updated to 2004 value. 22 Here, the users taken into account are those whose average annual consumption is more than 5 m 3 /month, to avoid consumption levels that are abnormally low including by-passed meters or dwellings occupied irregularly.
It thus appears that the low consumer group might have a specific trend, tending to approach its monthly billing threshold. This expected trend, after econometric analysis correcting for temperature variations, should be de-trended prior to being used as a control group. 4.1.5. Delaying payment of bills. Delaying payment of bills is also a way for a household to adjust to the price rise. Here it is approximated by the binary information taken according to whether a household paid (or did not pay) its bill by the due date (i.e. within 10 days). Average variations in the payment rate within 10 days between 2004 and 2003 are significant, especially for unmetered households and in the low-income areas, characterised by payment rates below average even before the price rise (Figure 12 ). In the poorest area, the drop in bill recovery level reaches 2 9% (for metered as well as unmetered households). The average drop in recovery level is 2 5.4% for unmetered households, while it stands at 2 3.3% for households consuming above the minimum threshold.
The recovery rate within 10 days dropped between 2003 and 2004 by 4% (in the better-off areas) to 9% (in the poorest neighbourhoods) for unmetered connections. It should be noted that in these lowincome areas, drop in the payment rate is of the same order for households billed for actual consumption. Although delay in payment is not an indicator as to actual eventual payment (the average level of recovery by the operator improves significantly at three months, reaching 76% for the entire concession Area in 2003 23 ), its relative value (year-on-year variation) provides a control for these households' behaviour in terms of payment of bills.
4.1.6. Disconnections. As a result of disconnections, a certain number of households that may have chosen to stop consuming water from the network, as a result of the tariff rise, are removed from the analysis sample. Ascribing zero consumption to these households would, however, not distinguish them from households not consuming while maintaining their active connection for a variety of reasons (temporary absence, etc.) and therefore still being invoiced at the minimum level. Furthermore, closure might be at the operator's request (after repeated failure to pay) but could also be at the user's request. Disconnections were limited in Area 1 whereas payment, already low, suffered the highest decrease. In 2004, 64% of disconnections were of unmetered connections, these closures totalling 10% of unmetered connections in Areas 3 and 4 with modest or high incomes (where the bills are also the highest). Cases of prolonged failure to pay do not seem to be dealt with equally by the operator, but it may also be a user decision with regard to the type of supply, and therefore linked to the available alternatives. The preliminary analysis of households with meters remaining active over the entire 24 months (and therefore of the cylindered sample) indicated an average drop in consumption between the two years, independently from the attrition of the sample (attrition, moreover, remaining slight for this category of user, only 2687 meters were permanently inactive in 2004, and are considered negligible for the rest of the analysis). 
Impact evaluation of the tariff increase
The tariff increase of January 2004 is considered as an exogenous shock applied between year a and year a þ 1. For each household i, the difference in consumption (ln) between the month m of the year a þ 1 and the month m of the year a is: Dln C ðm;iÞ ¼ ln C ðmðaþ1Þ;iÞ 2 ln C ðmðaÞ;iÞ
The difference no longer includes characteristics of households that have not changed between years a þ 1 and a (i.e. fixed household effects-this assumes no change in characteristics influencing demand such as the size and income of the household) as well as the fixed month effects. Only variables having varied between years a þ 1 and a, considered month by month, are now determining factors, i.e. the monthly rainfall, P, average monthly temperature, T, characteristics of household connections, X i (number of households sharing the bill, possible connection to sanitation system), and the tariff, whose effect will be measured in the constant linked to year a, this remaining constant within each year. Dln C ðm;iÞ ¼ DA þ a·Dln P ðmÞ þ b·Dln T ðmÞ þ g·DX ðm;iÞ þ DU ðm;iÞ
As the entire population connected to the water network was subject to the tariff rise simultaneously, there is no natural control group and the critical question of the counterfactual scenario arises. The aggregated monthly consumption communicated by the operator does not allow approximation of a possible consumption trend over several years, given the important changes in the structure of the customers set (extension into poor neighbourhoods, conversion of numerous unmetered connections to metering, separating of connections-decohabitations) but also because of the low or zero consumption recorded by the operator at the billing threshold. Estimation of this possible annual trend would have required individual data for an additional year before the tariff increase, i.e. for all of 2002.
An initial assumption, according to which there is no specific annual trend in the absence of the tariff rise, allows simple difference analysis of consumption month on month for households consuming above the billing threshold. Because of the lag between the month of consumption and the month of billing, the corresponding climatic data used is the average for the two months prior to billing. The residual variation measured between the two years will then be attributed to the price increase (þ31.51% between 2003 and 2004 for each consumption block) without former information on any possible shocks during this period.
A second assumption, according to which households consuming below the billing threshold have a specific gradual linear tendency to approach the threshold at which they are billed, allows, once this specific trend has been eliminated, to retain this group as the control group and to thus eliminate unobserved shocks (supply or other problems) that have affected the entire population. Under this assumption, and assuming that these households are affected by these shocks in the same way as the others, variation measured using the Difference in Difference method for consumers above the billing threshold can be attributed to the price rise between 2003 and 2004.
Econometric analysis of consumption variation by month-on-month difference
The data used for the econometric analysis are those for all of the metered households for which the connection was active at least once during the study period, after elimination, however, of (a) households having modified their type of connection (by ceasing to share or change in number of households), as the effects of these changes would be different depending on the initial consumption level 24 ; (b) households that change the status of their connection (water, or water and sanitation), as these modifications can be in both directions; and (c) households for which the average monthly consumption was not more than 5 m 3 /month 25 .
24 A household initially consuming below the threshold and separating into two households will double its bill, whereas a household consuming in the higher blocks will reduce its unit price while separating into two connections. 25 The users taken into account are those whose average annual consumption is more than 5 m 3 /month, to avoid abnormally low consumption including by-passed meters or dwelling used irregularly.
4.3.1. Simple difference analysis for consumers above the billing threshold. As time variations are partly due to climatic variations (monthly temperature and rainfall are not stable from one year to another), it is necessary to analyse these consumption variations once controlled for climatic variations, by regressing the monthly dummy coefficients, estimated from previous regression, on to the corresponding temperature and rainfall data so as to extract the error terms. The regression results are presented in the Appendix (Table 11 , available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf). Once the effect of climatic variations is allowed for, there is no visible time-related trend for monthly variations in the water consumption reduction (the coefficient of the error term is not significantly different from zero). In particular, the lower reductions observed at the start and end of the period (January and December; see Figure 13 , available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf) are corrected. Residual variations, unexplained by the variables available for analysis (of^2%), may be due to events affecting the entire city, as water supply incidents, or to variations in the interval between two meter readings (an interval which can vary from 29 to 32 days).
The analysis is therefore carried out for all year (monthly difference aggregated or with fixed effect), controlling for temperature and rainfall variations. As expected, the increase in temperature, and reduction in rainfall lead to increased water consumption. Finally, the factor of improvement in paying bills on time (to avoid cut off) also leads to a reduction in water consumption. Once controlling for these variations, the average reduction in consumption between 2003 and 2004 was 2 13.19% (20.1415 as a logarithm difference); see Table 3 .
Using the residence area as a proxy for living standard, we show that the households in Areas 1 and 2, the poorest areas, reduced their water consumption (213 to 2 15%) more than those in the better-off Areas 3 and 4 (211%); see Table 4 and also Table 12 in the Appendix for the complete regression parameters (available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf).
This greater price elasticity in the low-income neighbourhoods is, however, only slightly apparent because of the effect of the initial consumption level. For similar income levels, the higher the initial consumption level (average 2003 consumption), the greater the reduction in consumption in 2004 for all areas, reaching an amplitude of 2 25% for consumption blocks above 40 m 3 /month. Consumption level is, however, a complex variable in that it stands as a proxy for income but involves other aspects of water consumption, such as the existence of a consumption threshold that is only slightly compressible, and luxury consumption above that threshold that is more sensitive to price (see Table 5 ). High consumers were therefore those who moderated their consumption the most, although this reduction is less pronounced in well-off neighbourhoods 26 . Using average income per neighbourhood (IBGE 2000 Census data) to refine the effect of living standard on consumption variation, this effect appears significant and positive, i.e. income effectively moderates reduction in water consumption, and does so in spite of the effect of consumption level: the richer the residential area, the less households reduced their consumption in 2004 (see Table 13 in the Appendix, presenting the results of regression and including the average income of the neighbourhood instead of residence area variable. Available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf).
4.3.2. Simple difference analysis using household lining standard. The distributive impact of the tariff increase on household living standard was then assessed, using the households sample of the socioeconomic survey conducted by the Federal University of Amazonas (Ufam) in September 2004 27 . These households, taken from a representative sample of the city of Manaus (see the description of sample in Appendix A.2, available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf), were grouped by quintile based on monthly family income, expressed per adult equivalent 28 (Table 6 ). Amongst the households connected to the water network, 70% of the poorest receive fixed bills, either unmetered or under the billing threshold. They were therefore subject to a 31.5% bill increase without the opportunity of adjusting their consumption. Conversely, 63% of the wealthiest households, billed on the basis of their actual consumption, could adjust their bill. Actual household consumption is only known for those metered, i.e. around 60% of the connected population. Average and median individual consumption levels are 4.1 m 3 /capita/month and 3.4 m 3 /capita/month, respectively. Regression analysis of consumption difference was carried out, with the same control variables. Over this sample, reduced to households consuming above the consumption threshold and for which socio-economic data are available (849 households), temperature difference is no longer significant, and only the rainfall difference is kept as a climatic variable (see Table 6 and also Table 14 in the Appendix for the regression results, available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf).
The regression results confirm the trend approached by the preceding analysis based on residential area, i.e. that the poorest households (including those that had the opportunity to control their bill as, initially, they were consuming above the billing threshold) reduced their consumption more than the others following the tariff increase. Andrade & de Araùjo Lobão (1996) in Brazil and Blundell & Nauges (2002) in Cyprus also report greater price elasticity for water in the poorest households. The households in the first quintile (i.e. those amongst Manaus' poorest 20%) reduced their consumption by 21% between 2004 and 2003. The wealthiest households also reduced their consumption but in a lower proportion (2 10%). As a consequence of this reduction, the bills of households able to adjust their consumption increased by a median value of 16.5%, while that of the other households (70% of the poorest households connected to the water network, i.e. the major part of them) increased by 31.5%. 26 Households consuming in block 2 represent 60% of the sample used for elasticity, whereas blocks 5 and 6 represent only 4%. 27 3012 Households representative of Manaus' population were interviewed by field researchers from Ufam in September 2004. Of these, 2122 households out of 2282 connected to the water network were identified in the database of the operator Aguas do Amazonas. 28 The size of household in the denominator is raised to the power 0.7 to allow for scale efficiency. Figure 14 shows, for the control group, the coefficients for monthly dummies of the regression of the difference in water consumption, without controlling for climatic variations, and the regression error terms after controlling for climatic variations and for a uniform linear monthly trend (Figure 14 , available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf).
Two hypotheses are applied here to absorb the macroeconomic shocks to which all users were subject, but unobserved with the available data:
. low hypothesis: the consumption increase trend is specific to the category of user consuming below the billing threshold, as users attempt to approach the billed threshold. By eliminating this uniform trend, the monthly variation, once the climatic variation data have been equalised, becomes slightly negative. The implicit assumption becomes that, without price increase, the trend over time for all users, left unexplained by the available variables, is towards a slight reduction in consumption; . high hypothesis: the progressive increase in consumption observed for the control group is the counterfactual trend for all users. With the Difference in Difference method, the consumption variation between 2003 and 2004 for users consuming above the threshold is therefore lower than that measured by simple difference with the low hypothesis (212% against 2 13.2%), and is more pronounced with the high hypothesis (217.7%): see regression synthetic results in Table 7 and also Table 15 in the Appendix for details (available online at http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/045.pdf). Levels of variation accounting for heterogeneity of impact are also estimated and presented in Appendix A.3.3 (available online at http://www.iwaponline. com/wp/045.pdf). These two hypotheses encompass the estimate of corresponding average price elasticity, by attributing the entire residual variation to the 31.5% tariff increase, determining a bracket from 2 0.38 to 2 0.56, according to the prior trend assumption.
Conclusion
Water price increase in Manaus, although applied uniformly to all users, has differing effects for different categories of residents. Most of the poorest households experienced an effective increase in their water bills of 31.5%, i.e. of the same range as the unit price increase, as they consumed below the billing threshold of 10 m 3 /month or were billed on a pre-established fixed monthly amount. In this category of users, late payments increased more than in others. By contrast, better-off households had more opportunity to adapt their behaviour to the new prices, as they were mostly billed on their actual consumption; they reduced the impact of this price increase on their monthly bill, evidencing price elasticity of water consumption of 2 0.4 to 2 0.6 on average, according to the prior trend assumed, /month threshold consume in the second block), the poorest metered households reduced their consumption the most: price elasticity of first quintile households is estimated at 2 0.7 in the absence of a prior consumption trend. This finding reinforces earlier results from Andrade & de Araùjo Lobão (1996) in Brazil and Blundell & Nauges (2002) in Cyprus showing greater price elasticity for water in the poorest households.
The uniform price increase, by leading to a reduction of highest consumption, introduced a further imbalance into the cross-subsidy mechanism which was already hardly satisfactory, penalizing the poorest households, the majority of whom were billed on a fixed basis. Since then, a tariff reform project has been proposed by the operator in coordination with the services regulator, on the basis of a uniform tariff offset by a requirement to ensure a social tariff in the form of a rebate for eligible low-income households. Such targeted consumption subsidies appear well fitted to the Brazilian context, as eligible families are already identified through the Cadastro Unico for existing social programs. However, due to the political sensitivity of water tariff changes, only the social tariff has been acknowledged by the municipality in 2008, without further modification of the increasing block structure.
These findings highlight the fact that price-elasticity is not uniform across users, as high consumers might demonstrate higher price-elasticity, while small consumers close to subsistence level face little room (or no room at all) for adaptation. Consumption prediction should take into account such elasticity variations, especially with non linear tariffs where high consumers are expected to ensure a crosssubsidy contribution. In the challenging contexts of network expansion, where subsidized consumption increases with the integration of low income users, cost recovery objectives often lead to significant price increase. Subsequent consumption reductions might then severely alter the cross subsidy mechanism, thus questioning the adequacy of the increasing block tariff structure.
